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Stephen Jay Gould argued that replaying the ‘tape of life’ would result in
radically different evolutionary outcomes. Recently, biologists and philoso-
phers of science have paid increasing attention to the theoretical
importance of convergent evolution—the independent origination of similar
biological forms and functions—which many interpret as evidence against
Gould’s thesis. In this paper, we examine the evidentiary relevance of con-
vergent evolution for the radical contingency debate. We show that under
the right conditions, episodes of convergent evolution can constitute valid
natural experiments that support inferences regarding the deep counterfac-
tual stability of macroevolutionary outcomes. However, we argue that
proponents of convergence have problematically lumped causally hetero-
geneous phenomena into a single evidentiary basket, in effect treating all
convergent events as if they are of equivalent theoretical import. As a
result, the ‘critique from convergent evolution’ fails to engage with key
claims of the radical contingency thesis. To remedy this, we develop ways
to break down the heterogeneous set of convergent events based on the
nature of the generalizations they support. Adopting this more nuanced
approach to convergent evolution allows us to differentiate iterated evol-
utionary outcomes that are probably common among alternative
evolutionary histories and subject to law-like generalizations, from those
that do little to undermine and may even support, the Gouldian view of life.1. Replaying the tapes of life
In his book Wonderful Life: The Burgess Shale and the Nature of History, Gould [1]
proposes a series of macroevolutionary thought experiments designed to probe
the contingent nature of life’s history. Each involves rewinding the ‘tape of life’
to a different period in the history of animal evolution and asking how its
story would again unfurl. Gould’s most crucial thought experiment speaks to
the radical contingency of animal body plans that arose in the Cambrian,
which include most of the animal phyla in existence today along with a variety
of morphologically bizarre taxa that became extinct in the same period (p. 188,
227, 239). Gould argues that no biologist would have predicted the actual patterns
of survivorship in the end-Cambrian extinctions on the basis of any plausibly rel-
evant traits (e.g. degree of specialization, anatomical complexity, ecological
prominence, etc.). From this epistemic vantage point, Gould draws a metaphys-
ical conclusion, namely that early animal extinction patterns were essentially
haphazard and counterfactually non-replicable. He further contends that owing
to the path-dependent nature of macroevolution, these early stochastic sampling
events dramatically shaped the future history of animal life on the Earth.
Gould reaches comparable conclusions in relation to more fine-grained taxo-
nomic events, such as the seemingly improbable survival of lobe-finned fishes
and its implications for the origins of tetrapods (p. 317, 318), as well as the
extinction of the long-dominant non-avian dinosaurs, which allowed for the
unlikely radiation of mammals. He concludes, ‘any replay of the tape would
lead evolution down a pathway radically different from the road actually
taken’ (p. 51). We will refer to this as the radical contingency thesis (RCT).
Although Gould tended to focus on animal morphology, he argued that





2contingency’ (p. 290)—remarks which suggest that the RCT
was proposed not as a narrow claim about the evolution of
animal body plans, but rather as a general thesis about the
grand-scale organization of life on the Earth. For present
purposes, we will assume this broader reading of the RCT.
There have been many challenges over the years to different
elements of Gould’s thesis. For example, many of the seemingly
bizarre Cambrian taxa that inspired the RCT (Gould’s Wonderful
Life manuscript was originally titled Homage to Opabinia after
one such taxonomic oddity [2]) have been recognized under
modern evolutionary classification systems as ‘stem taxa’—
extinct basal lineages on the stems leading to the ‘crown’
groups represented by modern phyla.1 Whereas Gould was
fascinated by the Cambrian Problematica because of the
unique combinations of features they possessed, cladistic ana-
lyses ignored these features and instead used shared derived
characters to situate these taxa un-problematically in relation
to modern phyla. In doing so, however, the cladistic recon-
struction of Cambrian phylogeny simply bypassed the big
theoretical questions that occupied Gould, such as in relation
to patterns of early morphological disparity and extinction
and their implications for the nature of the evolutionary pro-
cess [4]. Even if it were the case that the early Cambrian fauna
did not reflect the broad range of forms that Gould believed
they did, this would not support the opposing view of life,
namely the ‘robust replicability thesis’, which argues that
macroevolutionary outcomes are robust (stable) across large
differences in initial conditions. This is because the robust
replicability view as it applies to the evolution of body
plans requires a merit-based competition among early
forms with lineage sorting based on functional superiority,
and such a competition could not exist if only a small range
of physically possible forms actually arose. In other words,
the lack of an early great experimentation phase would
only undermine the case for robust replicability, and would
do little to undercut the RCT. For all of these reasons, the
recent reclassification of the Cambrian fauna has left the
contingency dispute unresolved.
Here, we focus on a more promising challenge to the RCT
that appeals to the ubiquity of ‘convergent evolution’, or the
ostensibly independent origination of similar biological
forms and functions. Convergent evolution is taken by some
researchers to support the view that a hypothetical replay of
the tape of life on the Earth, and actual replays on the
Earth-like planets elsewhere, would likely result in similar,
predictable, outcomes. In this paper, we examine the eviden-
tiary relevance of convergent evolution for the contingency
debate. In §2, we consider where the RCT stands in relation
to biological prediction, explanation, chance and laws,
which in turn will help to clarify the types of evidence that
might bear on its adjudication. In §3, we review the ‘critique
from convergent evolution’, which views convergence as tan-
tamount to experimental replication in the history of life, and
we show that certain conceptual problems have prevented
this critique from making crucial contact with Gould’s core
claims. We go on in §4 to determine the conditions under
which episodes of convergent evolution can constitute valid
natural experiments that support inferences regarding the
deep robustness of evolutionary outcomes. We argue that
proponents of convergence have problematically lumped cau-
sally heterogeneous phenomena into a single evidentiary
basket, in effect treating all instances of convergent evolution
as if they are of equivalent theoretical import. We attempt toremedy this in §5 by proposing ways to break down the het-
erogeneous class of convergent events based on the nature of
the generalizations they support. Adopting this more nuanced
approach to convergent evolution lays the groundwork for
differentiating iterated evolutionary outcomes that are plausi-
bly common among alternative evolutionary histories and
subject to law-like generalizations, from those that do little
to undermine, and may even support, the Gouldian view of
life. This analysis sheds light on what convergence tells us
about constraints on the history of life as it has unfolded on
Earth, and how it might do in other parts of the universe.2. Biological contingency, predictability, chance
and laws
There are many non-equivalent definitions of evolutionary
contingency on offer. For present purposes, we will consider
an outcome merely contingent if its existence depends on the
occurrence of an event that might not have occurred, even if
the occurrence of this event was highly probable. For instance,
we might say that the evolution of life on earth is contingent
on the existence of nucleic acids, even though recent studies
suggest that nucleic acids are readily created in the energy
of asteroid impacts and hence are probably common in the
universe. We will consider an outcome radically contingent
when its existence depends on events occurring during a
given evolutionary path that are unlikely to be replicated
across the vast majority of alternative evolutionary histories.
Radically contingent systems may be contrasted with robustly
convergent systems in which many outcomes remain accessible
from distant evolutionary trajectories (figure 1).
Some theorists have suggested that we think of the RCT
as a claim about macroevolutionary path-dependence [5] or
macroevolutionary stochasticity [6] simplicter. However,
there may be systems that exhibit path-independence and
predictability at finer grains of phylogenetic resolution (e.g.
within orders, classes or phyla) but path-dependence and
unpredictability at courser grains (e.g. across phyla or the
whole of animal life), as depicted in figure 1c. Later (§3),
we argue that such a mixed contingent/convergent system
is consistent with, and indeed predicted by, the Gouldian
view of life. For now, we note that such a mixed system is
consistent with interpretations of Gouldian contingency
as involving path dependency and/or stochasticity at the
appropriate grain of resolution.
Outcomes are contingent (or radically contingent) only
with respect to a given initial set-up—so, for example, an out-
come might be robust with respect to complex multicellular
eukaryote evolution even if the origin of eukaryotes is itself
an improbable event. Gould’s Cambrian thought experiment
is structured in this manner, as it assumes the existence of
complex multicellular organization among its initial con-
ditions, and queries whether the evolution of specific body
plans and their associated regularities are stable across
replays of the multicellular tape of life. It follows that evol-
utionary outcomes will vary in their degree of evolutionary
robustness, depending on the nature of the events on which
they are contingent.
To complicate matters, not only do contingency and
robustness admit of degrees, but each may also apply to
many different evolutionary outcomes, some of which may
















Figure 1. (a) A radically contingent system in which outcomes (morphological, functional or relational) depend on improbable events occurring during the
evolutionary path under consideration. For example, at t2, some paths are not taken (dashed lines) owing to non-replicable events, causing a number of
evolutionary outcomes to become inaccessible at t3. Conversely, (b) a robustly convergent system in which many outcomes are still accessible from even very distant
evolutionary trajectories. For example, very divergent lineages at t3 are still able to converge on the same evolutionary outcome at t4. (c) A mixed contingent/
convergent system that exhibits path-independence and predictability at finer grains of resolution (reflecting evolutionary iteration within the developmental par-
ameters of orders, classes and phyla), but exhibiting path-dependence and unpredictability when viewed at courser grains (e.g. across phyla or the whole of animal
life). Such mixed systems are consistent with and arguably predicted by a Gouldian view of life that accords theoretical primacy to internal developmental con-






methodological implication of this is that a handful of puta-
tive counterexamples can at best refute parts of the RCT,
not the thesis as a whole. These methodological difficulties
are not unique to the contingency dispute, as they confront
many other ‘relative significance debates’ in evolutionary
biology [7]. It is nonetheless meaningful to ask whether con-
tingency is a dominant theme in macroevolution and to
investigate the specific outcomes to which it applies.
Gould tended to illustrate the RCT in terms of ex ante
unpredictability, an epistemic state he attributed to the ideal-
ized observer in his macroevolutionary thought experiments.
However, linking contingency and unpredictability is mis-
leading because it conflates metaphysical and epistemic
claims, resulting in misinterpretations of Gould’s thesis (§3).
Even if a late-Cretaceous observer could have predicted the
K–Pg impact and the ensuing dinosaurian extinctions and
mammalian radiations, and even if this idealized observer
were capable of explaining the latter evolutionary outcomes
by recourse to causes and laws of nature—these events
would still be radically contingent. This is because the RCT
is fundamentally a metaphysical (modal) thesis, not an epistemic
one—it holds that certain macroevolutionary outcomes are
highly sensitive to low probability events that are unlikely to
be replicated across the vast majority of alternative histories
of life. In Gould’s words: ‘Alter any early event, ever so slightly
and without apparent importance at the time, and evolution
cascades into a radically different channel’ ([1, p. 51] and
[8, p. 1333]). It simply does not matter, for purposes of charac-
terizing these dynamics, whether this metaphysics translates
into unpredictability or undermines explanation.
Unfortunately, Gould abetted confusion on these points by
contrasting the ‘contingent phenomenology’ of natural history
with Laplacean determinism [8, p. 1333]. Yet if classic deter-
minism is true, rewinding the tape of life is a trivial exercise,because the trajectory of life would unfold in precisely the
same way. Determinism tells us nothing about the accidental
or law-like nature of macroevolutionary outcomes. The RCT
does not require that either objective macro-indeterminism or
chaotic causal determinism obtain in macroevolution—it
requires only that relevant outcomes are instable across the
vast majority of nomically possible evolutionary worlds.
The RCT is best understood, therefore, as a universal bio-
logical claim about the sensitivity of large-scale evolutionary
outcomes to initial conditions [2,4–11]. The claim is universal
because it cites causal mechanisms applicable to all nomically
possible histories of life. These include stochasticity, dev-
elopmental entrenchment, mutational ordering, sequences of
selection regimes and other processes that result in non-
replicable, path-dependent and irreversible trajectories of
macroevolution [12]. Thus, we think that contrary to the read-
ing of some commentators [13], Gould’s macroevolutionary
thought experiments were intended to draw lessons about the
counterfactual stability of the evolution of life on the Earth-
like worlds in general, not merely life as we know it on the
Earth. Whether or not this was Gould’s intention, the theoreti-
cal framework of the RCT supports these broader implications.
Given this emphasis on nomic necessity, one might be
tempted to think that the RCT debate boils down to whether
there are biological laws describing the evolution of form and
function—that if such laws are found, then Gould’s thesis
will have been refuted. Indeed, Gould repeatedly attributed
contingency in the history of life to the lack of invariant bio-
logical laws [8, p. 696, 1055, 1227, 1333]. Nevertheless, the
RCT is not in tension with the existence of biological laws
tout court. As we just saw, the RCT is itself premised on uni-
versal biological properties, and perhaps laws [14], that
underwrite the stochastic, path-dependent nature of macro-





4laws (such as the zero force evolutionary law [15], which
describes the tendency of biological systems to increase in
diversity over time). What would pose a problem for the
RCT is the existence of strict deductive laws that describe the
evolution of form and function. Such generalizations would be
universally projectable, support evolutionary counterfactuals
and hold across alternative evolutionary histories.
Still, there are good reasons to divorce the contingency
debate from disputes over the existence of laws in biology.
Although philosophers of science have linked the supposed
‘nomological vacuum’ in biology to the metaphysics of evol-
utionary contingency [7], there are ‘looser’ accounts of
lawhood that allow highly contingent antecedent conditions
to be incorporated into law-like statements, and the existence
of laws on such accounts may be consistent with the RCT. For
instance, Sober [16] argues that generalizations formulated in
terms of counterfactual conditionals with historically contin-
gent antecedents can satisfy the desiderata for lawhood
because, so formulated, they are exceptionless and universal.
While Sober is right that the relations described by such con-
ditionals are not in themselves radically contingent, if they
contain antecedent conditions that are radically contingent,
this will undermine the robustness of the outcomes they
describe [17]. Given the diversity of philosophical thinking
about lawhood, linking the radical contingency question to
a verdict on biological laws is liable to confuse more than it
is to illuminate.
It is better, we believe, to view the RCT as a series of
claims about the frequency of certain outcomes across poss-
ible evolutionary histories. Low probability outcomes
become probable given a sufficiently large population of
chance set-ups. A key question for purposes of the contin-
gency debate, therefore, is whether a single history of life
constitutes a sufficiently large population of chance setups so as
to make certain low probability outcomes probable in any given his-
tory of life. Gould appears to be making this sort of frequency
claim when, for example, he discusses the contingency of
human evolution:[I]f life started with all its models present, and constructed a later
history from just a few survivors, then we face a disturbing possi-
bility. Suppose that only a few will prevail, but all have an equal
chance. The history of any surviving set is sensible, but each
leads to a world thoroughly different from any other. If the
human mind is a product of only one such set, then we may
not be randomly evolved in the sense of coin flipping, but our
origin is the product of massive historical contingency, and we
would probably never arise again even if life’s tape could be
replayed a thousand times. [1, p. 233–234]Gould thus argues that owing to the stochastic nature of cer-
tain key history of life-shaping events, many evolutionary
outcomes would occur very infrequently across alternative
evolutionary histories.
If the universe is infinite or nearly so, then there will be
many runs of the tape of life that are very similar to our own.
The question before us, therefore, is one of modal frequency.
On this reading, the existence of law-like evolutionary out-
comes with very low modal frequencies—that is, outcomes
that obtain necessarily or with high probability but only
under conditions that are astronomically uncommon in the
universe—do not undermine the RCT or support the robust
replicability view. This provides yet further reason to separate
the contingency question from the question of laws in biology.
In what follows, we consider the circumstances under whichconvergent evolution may be taken as evidence for the
higher modal frequencies of certain evolutionary outcomes.3. The critique from convergent evolution and its
limitations
How might the contingency debate be adjudicated? The
most straightforward way of evaluating the RCT would
be to observe numerous independent histories of life. Each
would begin from a wide range of initial conditions with
respect to geophysical variables, the ordering of mutations,
ecological relations, major evolutionary innovations and
so on. With these data in hand, we would then search for
regularities that allow us to infer frequency distributions
and the macroevolutionary processes that underpin them.
Unfortunately, we are currently privy to a single history of
life, and thus we are unable to investigate the stability
of large-scale evolutionary outcomes in this way. Gould’s
macroevolutionary thought experiments are designed to
circumvent this ‘n ¼ 1’ problem [18], but such exercises of
the imagination, even if intuitively compelling to some, are
ultimately speculative and empirically inconclusive. Other
approaches to biological contingency involve running
controlled evolutionary experiments on microbes [19],
observations of selection on animals in the wild [20] and
evolutionary simulations [21], but such studies have limited
or indeterminate generalizability to large-scale patterns in
eukaryotic evolution that only manifest over immense
geological timescales.2
Biologists and philosophers of science have begun paying
increasing theoretical attention to convergent evolution, as it
offers a promising avenue for evaluating the RCT.3 Unlike the
outcomes of controlled evolutionary experiments in the lab-
oratory or observations of natural selection in the field,
studies of convergent evolution can draw upon a voluminous
database of natural history to make inferences about the
robustness of evolutionary processes operating over vast
timescales and across immense phylogenetic gaps. From
the standpoint of the robust replicability view, we are not
confronted with an n ¼ 1 problem after all, because conver-
gence amounts to natural experimental replication in the
histories of life. Proceeding on this interpretation, some biol-
ogists have compiled expansive evidence bases of convergent
evolution with the aim of debunking, or casting serious
doubt on, Gould’s thesis [24–26]. Philosophers of science
have read convergent evolution in similar ways [27,28].
Convergence is widely regarded as evidence for adap-
tation [29]: the fact that both ichthyosaurs and dolphins
evolved flippers in an aquatic environment strongly sug-
gests their flippers are similarly functional. But convergence
can also be read as evidence for three additional, more
philosophically onerous claims that underpin the robust
replicability view of life: first, that certain design problems
are pervasive in the history of life; second, that the set of evol-
utionary solutions to pervasive design problems is highly
circumscribed and third, that these restricted solutions are
accessible to selection notwithstanding the ‘internal’ con-
straints of phylogeny. As we see (§4), drawing each of these
inferences from existing data on convergent evolution can
be highly problematic.
Before elaborating on these evidential issues, it is worth





5the critique from convergent evolution from engaging with
key claims of the RCT. One such problem is that prominent
critiques have often mischaracterized or attacked straw-man
versions of Gould’s thesis, which in turn has led them to
misjudge the evidential value of convergence vis-à-vis the
RCT. For example, George McGhee, in his leading review
of convergent evolution, refutes several claims that he attri-
butes to Gould, but which Gould almost certainly did not
hold. One such refutation is ‘the view that the evolutionary
process is nonrepeating is demonstrably false’ [24, p. 271].
Indeed, much of the philosophical attention to Gould’s
thesis has likewise focused on its implications for the non-
repeatability and unpredictability of evolutionary outcomes
[5,6,9,14,27].
However, there is ample room within the Gouldian
view of life for a great deal of evolutionary iteration and
predictability. By giving theoretical primacy to internal
developmental constraints, the RCT, in fact, predicts certain
kinds of repetition, namely repetitions that result from
entrenched developmental systems that make certain adaptive
outcomes more likely given their accessibility to selection.4
To illustrate this phenomenon, Gould offers the repeated
evolution in crustaceans of maxillipeds, feeding appendages
that evolved from anterior walking legs, which was accom-
plished by the iterated selective deployment of homologous
developmental pathways [8, p. 1134]. On the Gouldian
view, evolutionary iterations such as these are only possible
because of conserved developmental constraints and, cru-
cially, these constraints could easily have been otherwise.
This scenario is illustrated in schematic form by the system
depicted in figure 1c, which exhibits path independence
(convergence) at finer grains of phylogenetic resolution but
path-dependence at courses grains.
In sum, the contingency dispute turns not on the existence
of evolutionary repetitions per se, but on the causes of evol-
utionary iteration and whether they support the deep
evolutionary robustness of the outcomes observed. What con-
tingency theorists like Gould reject is the proposition that the
driving forces behind convergence often transcend the con-
tingently entrenched developmental plans of particular
lineages. The key question, therefore, is whether instances
of evolutionary iteration reflect this transcendence—and the
problem is that whether they do, as we shall see in §4, is
underdetermined by convergence data as it has thus far
been collected and analysed.
Gould has also been criticized for advocating, as McGhee
puts it, that ‘evolution is entirely historically contingent, and
thus unpredictable (and nonrepeating)’ [24, p. 271]. Yet
Gould states in no uncertain terms that he is not arguing
that all of evolution is historically contingent and
unpredictable:Am I really arguing that nothing about life’s history could be pre-
dicted, or might follow directly from general laws of nature? Of
course not; the question that we face is one of scale, or level of
focus. Life exhibits a structure obedient to physical principles.
We do not live amidst a chaos of historical circumstance. . .Much
about the basic form of multicellular organisms must be con-
strained by rules of construction and good design. . .Invariant
laws of nature impact the general forms and functions of organ-
isms; they set the channels in which organic design must evolve.
But the channels are so broad relative to the details that fascinate
us! . . . When we set our focus upon the level of detail that regu-
lates most common questions about the history of life,
contingency dominates and the predictability of general formrecedes to an irrelevant background. . .almost every interesting
event of life’s history falls into the realm of contingency.
[1, p. 289–290]Gould, it seems, would be happy to grant that (for example) the
fusiform shape is an evolutionarily robust feature of complex
multicellular aquatic life wherever it evolves. What he would
deny is that the specific elements of body plans are themselves
robust features of complex multicellular evolution wherever
it evolves [8, p. 1212]. Ubiquitous convergence on fusiform
morphology does little to detract from this conclusion.
One weak point in the above excerpt, however, is Gould’s
relative interest claim. Why should universal biomechanical
constraints on the evolution of form not be as interesting to
biologists as the quirky, more detailed outcomes of evol-
ution? Gould offers no argument to support this claim.
Indeed, as Haufe [14] contends, Gould’s push for a nomo-
thetic palaeontology shows that he was committed to the
idea that a central goal of science, and indeed, palaeobiology,
is to uncover spatio-temporally invariant laws. Whatever one
makes of Gould’s advocacy of historical narratives, it is hard
to defend the claim that universal selective constraints on the
evolution of form are uninteresting. In effect, Gould is making
a rhetorical move similar to one that he, writing with Richard
Lewontin, famously excoriated in the context of advancing
non-selective explanations [30, p. 585]:In natural history, all possible things happen sometimes; you gener-
ally do not support your favoured phenomenon by declaring rivals
impossible in theory. Rather, you acknowledge the rival, but cir-
cumscribe its domain of action so narrowly that it cannot have
any importance in the affairs of nature. Then, you often congratulate
yourself for being such an undogmatic and ecumenical chap.Gould seems to be engaging in the very mode of argument
for which he chastises adaptationists: he acknowledges
there are some robustly replicable outcomes in evolution, but
he relegates these to theoretically uninteresting phenomena
in the history of life.
In short, both contingency theorists and convergence pro-
ponents intend to make universal biological claims about
their favoured evolutionary dynamics—contingency in one
case and convergence in the other—but they disagree as to
the relative significance of these respective phenomena in
any given history of life. With a clearer picture of the dis-
agreement between contingency theorists and convergence
proponents in mind, we will now go on to consider the cir-
cumstances in which evolutionary repetitions might serve
as evidence against the RCT.4. Evaluating the validity of natural experiments
in convergent evolution
In what sense might convergent evolution constitute ‘exper-
imental’ evidence that bears on the RCT? Although we
normally think of scientific experiments as involving the
manipulation of independent variables to assess their causal
influence on dependent variables, ‘to conduct an experiment’,
broadly construed, is simply to put one’s self in an epistemic
vantage point from which to make observations that affect
our confidence in hypotheses about the causal, nomological
or historical structure of the world. Given such a broad con-
ception of experiment, it is not easy to draw a distinction
between observational studies that make use of conditions





6deliberate manipulation of nature, whether in terms of their
procedures, epistemic goals, or confirmatory power [31].5
Nevertheless, natural experiments, which are common in
the human sciences, are in certain ways more like proper
manipulation-based experiments than they are like observa-
tional studies. This is because they are structured in ways
that resemble a manipulationist experimental structure that
might be designed by human agents were they tasked with
running experiments to probe certain hypotheses or to make
certain measurements. In natural experiments, researchers
select samples that differ naturally in one or more indepen-
dent variables but which are similar with respect to other
variables, typically with the aim of corroborating a causal-his-
torical hypothesis. Although natural experiments lack the
control of laboratory and field experiments (thus risking
internal validity), they have the advantage of allowing biol-
ogists to gather data across numerous taxa and habitats,
reflecting vast timespans of evolution [34]. For instance,
studies of plant and animal colonizations of isolated islands
following the volcanic destruction of endemic ecosystems
have been characterized as natural experiments—replays of
the ecological tape from which biologists might infer relations
that hold-up across disparate phylogenetic and environmental
contexts. This breadth and depth of study, often impossible in
laboratory and field experiments, permits inferences that are
projectable to large-scale patterns in the history of life.
Like laboratory experiments, natural experiments can be
contaminated, poorly structured and misleading. A crucial
feature of natural evolutionary experiments is that they are
isolated in ways that control for the relevant confounding
variables.6 The confounding variables that must be controlled
in any given natural experiment are determined by the
research questions being investigated or the hypotheses
being tested. The key for present purposes, therefore, is to
identify the validity criteria of natural experiments in conver-
gent evolution for purposes of assessing the RCT. Evaluating the
set-up of natural experiments in convergence for this specific
evidentiary purpose requires at a minimum that we assess
the ‘independence’ of observed replications by controlling
for the influence of conserved developmental mechanisms.
Failure to do so has resulted in flawed experimental set-
ups, even in supposedly paradigmatic cases of natural
experiments in convergent evolution.
For example, Morgan [35] touts John Beatty’s [27]
discussion of studies documenting the iterated evolution of
Anolis lizard ecomorphs [36]—forms adapted to specialized
microhabitats on isolated islands in the Caribbean—as
paradigmatic natural evolutionary experiments that meet
the requisite isolation conditions. Indeed, both Beatty [27]
and Losos et al. [36] interpret these natural evolutionary
experiments as contradicting Gould’s thesis. However, as
tests of the RCT, these experiments are invalid, because despite
their geographical separation, the observed evolutionary sys-
tems are not isolated in crucial respects. In particular, the
target systems begin with highly similar initial developmental
conditions and thus fail to rule out the possibility that
‘positive’ internal constraints are responsible for the observed
iterations.
A broader problem with evidential appeals to natural
experiments in convergent evolution is that the sense of
‘independence’ that is operative in dominant definitions of
convergence does not support some of the evidential uses
to which convergence is put in the contingency debate. Forexample, on the standard ‘taxic’ account of convergence,7 to
satisfy the independence criterion, a similar trait in two
lineages must not have been present in and continuously
transmitted from their common ancestor [37]. A minority
view [38] holds that satisfying the independence criterion
requires that the genetic-developmental machinery causally
responsible for a character resemblance must not have been
continuously inherited from a common ancestor. Other
authors wanting to distinguish iterations produced by
shared developmental machinery have chosen to retain stan-
dard definitions of homology and instead distinguish
between parallel and convergent homoplasies, where ‘paral-
lelism’ is loosely defined as homoplasy that is underwritten
by conserved developmental generators [10,11,39,40].
These different readings of the independence criterion have
different implications for the evidentiary relevance of conver-
gence. On the ‘taxic’ account, convergent evolution can ensue
from both highly similar and highly disparate initial develop-
mental conditions, resulting in a causally heterogeneous set
of convergent events with differential implications for the evol-
utionary robustness of the regularities observed. The latter
views, in contrast, do more to control for the ‘internal’ develop-
mental determinants of iterated evolution, because they
classify iterated traits produced by conserved generators as
homologies or parallel homoplasies, rather than as cases of
convergence simpliciter.
Because convergence proponents have tended to operate
with the standard taxic framework for convergent evolution,
their analyses have failed to distinguish natural experimental
set-ups in convergent evolution that do not speak to the RCT
from those that could genuinely undermine it. In essence,
prominent studies of convergent evolution from which con-
clusions about the RCT are drawn have been working with
tainted experimental set-ups. As a result, the critique from
convergent evolution is unable to differentiate biological
regularities that reflect deep truths about the living universe
from those that are essentially accidental. We refer to this
indiscriminate grouping of heterogeneous convergent
events as the ‘lumping problem’.
For instance, McGhee’s [24] review of convergent evolution
is a significant improvement over previous efforts because it
includes extensive phylogenetic information; however, it fails
to use this important data to control for the internal develop-
mental determinants of iterated evolution. Consider the more
than 20 instances of cantharophilous flowers evolving special-
ized morphologies to facilitate pollination by beetles (p. 121).
The prediction ‘where there are beetles, there will be cantharo-
philous flowers’ may be law-like on looser accounts of
biological laws, but if ‘beetle’ phenotypes and ecologies are
highly contingent, then the outcomes to which this prediction
refers will be highly restricted and add little to our understand-
ing of the deep structure of evolution. The same goes for
Conway Morris’s [25, p. 211] discussion of iterations like ant
mimicry, which has evolved more than 70 times in insects
and spiders: if the ‘ant’ and broader ‘arthropod’ phenotype is
radically contingent, then ant mimicry will not be projectable
to alternative evolutionary histories. A compilation of such
regularities may indicate the deep evolutionary robustness of
very broad phenomena like coevolution and mimicry—but
as we argued earlier, this is not the level of detail at which
the contingency debate takes place.
The upshot is that the sheer number of iterations, without





7robustness of the regularity they comprise. Dozens of conver-
gences on flower and ant morphologies offer far weaker
evidence against the RCT than do convergences that are
fewer in number but that can be shown to arise from broad
physico-chemical constraints on life. In short, the high fre-
quency of an outcome in this evolutionary history, without
further analysis, cannot be taken to imply a high frequency
across alternative evolutionary histories. Unfortunately, pro-
minent theoretical treatments of convergent evolution have
tended to lump broad generalizations, like fusiform shapes,
with narrower generalizations, like cantharophilous flowers,
as if the total body of evidence spoke against the RCT. Yet
as we have shown, the fact that structures or functions
recur in evolution is not always, or even often, evidence
that they are universal or probable across alternative histories
of life. The data do not speak for itself, because the causes of
evolutionary iteration are underdetermined. This failure to
differentiate among convergent events may be due, in part,
to the common misconception that the RCT predicts the
wholesale lack of repetition in evolution (§3). Whatever its
motivation, lumping is harmful to the critique from conver-
gent evolution because it obscures the strongest evidence
against the RCT. In compiling a body of undifferentiated
data on convergence, the whole is less than the sum of
its parts.
As we saw earlier, the crux of Gould’s disagreement with
convergence proponents turns not on whether evolutionary
iteration is important, but why it is important, and what it sig-
nifies about the causal structure of the biological world. Let
us call it ‘Gouldian repetition’ when evolutionary iteration
results from selection acting on radically contingent con-
served developmental substrates or their sequelae. Let us
refer to all other iterations as cases of ‘true convergence’.8
The key is to identify meaningful cases of true convergence,
and then to assess the relative significance of such events in
the overarching history of life.9
Iterations that constitute Gouldian repetitions do not sup-
port the ‘critique from convergent evolution’ because they fail
to serve as evidence for three key premises of the robust
replicability view (§3). First, they fail to show that certain
design problems are pervasive in the history of life, because
the design problems that prompt Gouldian repetitions may
be shaped by the internal developmental parameters of the
clade and thus may be highly restricted in scope. Second,
Gouldian repetitions fail to show that the set of solutions to
these design problems is highly circumscribed by forces
other than conserved developmental constraints. Third, they
fail to show that these restricted solutions are accessible to
selection notwithstanding the internal constraints of phylo-
geny, because internal constraints are integral to defining
and explaining Gouldian repetitions.
We should not assume, however, that all iterated regu-
larities underwritten by developmental biases constitute
Gouldian repetitions. For instance, the hammerhead ribo-
zyme, a catalytic RNA that undergoes self-cleavage, has
evolved convergently many times, quite possibly as a result
of biases that are intrinsic to genotype–phenotype maps
[45]. Thus, we should not assume that deep replicability in
macroevolution hinges entirely on the power of selection,
even though convergence is often taken to be evidence of
selection’s power.
This discussion raises a thorny problem: how can we deter-
mine empirically whether a given iteration is a case ofGouldian repetition or a case of true convergence? One work-
able approach would be to infer a degree of developmental
independence that is proportional to phylogenetic distance.
Let us call this the ‘taxonomy heuristic’. The taxonomy heuris-
tic helps explain why a small number of convergences across
kingdoms, phyla and classes tend to indicate deeper counter-
factual stability than, say, numerous convergences confined
to families, genera and species. The trouble with such a
heuristic, however, is that phylogenetic distance is not always
a good indicator of developmental difference when it comes
to evolutionary iteration. It is now well established that con-
vergence between higher taxonomic groupings can be caused
by the activation of ‘deep homologues’, developmental sub-
strates conserved across vast phylogenetic distances. We
must therefore develop more precise ways of assessing the
independence of convergent episodes and not rely exclusively
on the blunt instrument of phylogenetic distance (§5).
A further challenge relates to quantifying the degree of
convergence, which one might think crucial to the contin-
gency debate. As with counting the number of repetitions,
however, merely quantifying the degree of convergence
tells us little about the evolutionary robustness of the regu-
larity observed. Weaker degrees of convergence that
transcend the body plans of disparate clades (such as vivipar-
ity or filter-feeding or the fusiform shape) offer stronger
evidence of deep robustness than do higher degrees of con-
vergence within shared developmental constraints (such as
Anolis lizard or dolphinoid ecomorphology).5. Towards a taxonomy of convergence
We have argued that instances of convergent evolution can,
under certain conditions, constitute natural experiments that
bear on the RCT. However, we have also shown that the
causes of iterated evolution are underdetermined in ways
that affect the validity of the experimental set-ups. Lumping
together causally heterogeneous convergent events has
detracted from what might otherwise be a persuasive case
against the RCT. To remedy this, we will distinguish biologi-
cal iterations along several dimensions that have implications
for their evidentiary relevance to the contingency debate. We
will argue that convergent regularities exhibiting high levels
of what we term specificity, independence and scope constitute
the strongest evidence against the RCT. These categories
apply to all types of evolutionary outcomes (not merely
those surrounding the evolution of animal body plans), and
thus they offer a way of evaluating the RCT read broadly as
a thesis about the whole of life.
5.1. Specificity
It is widely appreciated that convergence and homology are
relative to hierarchical level. For instance, a structure can be
convergent at the level of morphology while being homolo-
gous at the level of tissues, proteins or genes. Many of the
described cases of convergence are ‘superficial’ in the sense
that the details of their structure and, especially, their under-
lying developmental architecture, can be dramatically
divergent [46]. Contingency may dominate the molecular
particulars of development while convergence reins at the
level of general form. We might therefore want to distinguish
convergences that occur on multiple levels simultaneously





8see, however, the fact that a specific structure was realized
independently by completely different molecular-develop-
mental pathways bespeaks its evolutionary robustness—and
the more specific that structure is, the more it contradicts
the RCT’s claim that contingent history dominates at the
level of details ‘that have always defined the guts and soul
of biology’ [8, p. 1212].
Convergence is relative not only to hierarchical level, but also
to the degree of specificity at which a given trait is delineated.10
The ‘specificity’ of an iteration here refers to the number of
shared character dimensions at a given level of biological
organization—e.g. genes, proteins, cells, morphology, etc.—
a measure that applies equally to homologies as it does to
convergences. Generally speaking, one trait is more specific
than another when it occupies a higher ‘level’ in a nested
multiple realization base: e.g. blubber is more specific than
insulation, and AFP type II is more specific than ice-binding
protein. In this case, ‘levels’ refer to the degree of abstraction
with which a trait is described, not to levels of biological
organization. Insulation and blubber are traits at the same
organizational level, but the former is less specific than the
latter because it implicates fewer character dimensions. All
else equal, the less specific a convergent regularity, the
more likely it is to be evolutionarily robust.
Consider a sensory modality like hearing. The tympanal
organ or ‘ear’ in insects (a vibrating drum-like structure) and
its neuronal accouterments have evolved more than 20 times
in the bodies, wings and legs of various insects to detect
pressure waves generated by sound. A structurally similar
ear has evolved in vertebrates using radically different devel-
opmental machinery—an instance of cross-phyla convergence
on a highly physically constrained function that indicates the
deep evolutionary robustness of this specific structural trait.
However, if ‘hearing’ is defined more broadly to include not
only drum-like structures, but any specialized capacity to
detect sound vibrations in a substrate and to translate these
stimuli into neuronal impulses used to generate adaptive
behaviour, then the trait will be less structurally specific but
far more evolutionarily robust. In this way, the multiple realiz-
ability of function can underwrite the evolutionary robustness
of functions even while it undercuts the law-like replicability
of form [48].
Generality, however, can come with a cost: vague regu-
larities are typically less scientifically useful and interesting.
Compare the following predictions about thermoregulation:
‘organisms will evolve a covering with the property of ther-
mal conservation’ and ‘organisms will evolve strategies for
maintaining viable internal temperatures’. The former
description admits of a limited set of possible realizations,
whereas the latter, though highly evolutionarily robust, is
so vague it might be realized by an indefinite disjunction of
structural or functional configurations. In contrast, the anti-
freeze protein AFP type II is a molecule with a very specific
structure that has evolved a handful of times for the function
of lowering the freezing temperature to prevent cell rupture
[24, p. 190].11 Because numerous proteins have ice-binding
properties, however, ‘anti-freeze’ is a multiply realizable
property that has been achieved through selection on differ-
ent genes and molecular mechanisms, with a diverse range
of proteins evolving in groups as disparate as animals,
plants, fungi and prokaryotes [51].
A key point of weakness in the critique from convergent
evolution relates to ambiguities regarding the specificity ofthe trait under consideration. Take, for instance, McGhee’s
formulation of the following regularity: ‘If any large, fast-
swimming organisms exist in the oceans of Jupiter’s moon
Europa. . .I predict with confidence that they will have
streamlined, fusiform bodies; that is, they will look very simi-
lar to a porpoise, an ichthyosaur, a swordfish, or a shark’ [24,
p. 272]. The ambiguity here lies with the phrase ‘look very
similar’. If McGhee is making the weaker, less interesting
claim that aquatic extraterrestrial ‘animals’ would have a fusi-
form shape, then, as we have seen, Gould would be unlikely
to disagree. Yet at finer grains of resolution, variation
between such course-grained convergences can be enormous
[13,46]. If, on the other hand, McGhee is making the stronger
and more interesting claim that such organisms would
resemble sharks or porpoises in features other than their fusi-
form morphology, then we run into a problem of evidence.
Squid have spindle shapes, but in all other respects (save
for their camera-type eye) bear little resemblance to a shark
or a porpoise. Because we see only ‘dolphinoid’ convergence
within the vertebrate body plan—i.e. in Mesozoic marine rep-
tiles, cetaceans and perhaps fish—this tells us little about
the evolutionary robustness of these more specific outcomes
across the whole of complex multicellular life. The same is
true, for example, of convergence between marsupial and
placental mammals, and within placentals, on a range of
ecomorphologies throughout the Cenozoic [52]. Such
observations do not clearly contradict Gould’s thesis, because
they may be caused by entrenched developmental constraints
driving iterated evolution within clades.
This analysis of specificity helps to resolve key points of
disagreement in the contingency discussion. Recall Gould’s
claim that universal generalizations about form and function
do not speak to the details that fascinate biologists. We might
reasonably interpret the RCT as claiming that only highly
non-specific biological regularities about the evolution of
form and function will be evolutionarily robust. Advocates
of the robust replicability view, on the other hand, argue
that some cases of convergence support robust regularities
with fairly high levels of specificity.
Yet there remains an unsatisfactory vagueness in all of
this. Because the RCT and its opposing thesis have been
underspecified, it is difficult, in some cases, to determine at
what degree of specificity convergence begins to contradict
the RCT. We can say that iterated traits as specific as the
camera-type eye are among the strongest (though still not
definitive) cases against the RCT (Box 1), whereas others as
vague as ‘sensory apparatus’ leave the RCT unchecked.
Still others, such as urticating hair, fall into a greyer eviden-
tial zone. Yet the key to this discussion is not which
evolutionary outcomes contradict the RCT, but which are
robust in relevant ways and which are not. We can begin to
answer this question by specifying the outcome in question
and then considering the evidence for and nature of its
evolutionary replicability.5.2. Independence
The lumping problem as described above (§4) stems in part
from the failure to take into account the independence of
observed evolutionary iterations. By saying that evolutionary
iterations vary in terms of their independence, we mean they
vary in the degree of conserved molecular-developmental gen-
erators that they implicate. Ceteris paribus, a small number of
Box 1. Case study: image-forming eyes.
When faced with a particular convergent event, an analysis of its specificity, independence and scope can help us to assess its
evidentiary relevance for the contingency debate. An example of a convergent regularity that arguably exhibits high levels of
all of these features is the iterated evolution of image-forming eyes.
Specificity. The image-forming eye includes several distinct eye types—variations on camera and compound configur-
ations—each of which is highly structurally specific, including particular cornea, lens and retina configurations. Both
major eye types exhibit wide phylogenetic distribution, originating numerous times in distant animal phyla [53]. Camera-
type eyes, for example, have evolved not only in vertebrates, arthropods, molluscs and cnidarians, but even in microbial
eukaryotes [54].
Scope. Image-forming eyes are likely to have broad scope given the ubiquity of the light stimulus, the universal laws of
optics, and the availability of substrates that can readily be coopted for optical functions. For example, a diverse set of crystal-
lin proteins have been used for lens transparency, and the photoreceptor pigment rhodopsin is functionally optimized to
trigger an electrophysiological cascade in response to individual quanta of light, suggesting that optimal solutions to this
highly constrained design problem are accessible to selection.
Independence. The complex morphological arrangements characteristic of the major eye types are polyphyletic, and
they are produced by diverse molecular developmental pathways in the phylogenetically disparate lineages in which
they are found. However, there are two interrelated facts that might lead one to think these impressive iterations
might be Gouldian repetitions. First, there is a growing consensus that the two cell types involved in photoreception
were present in the ancestor of all bilaterians [55] and, on some accounts, descended from a single photoreceptive
cell that originated once in early cyanobacteria and was subsequently taken up by eukaryotic cells in endosymbiotic
events [56]. Second, all known eyes in animals are produced by certain conserved molecular sequences that are
relied upon in development—such as deep homologues like ‘Pax-6’, which serve as ‘master control’ genes that trigger
eye morphogenesis in groups as diverse as vertebrates and arthropods. Do these genetic and cell-type homologies pre-
vent us from classifying the iterated evolution of complex eyes as cases of true convergence? There are several reasons
why we believe they may not. First, as noted above, the weight of the evidence suggests that the ancestral bilaterian did
not have complex eyes, even if it possessed Pax-6 and both types of photoreceptors [57], and thus describing ‘eyes’ as
monophyletic would be misleading. Second, the presence of conserved molecular developmental homologues, such as
Pax-6, does not in itself (contra Gould [8]) undermine the independence of such iterated outcomes for purposes of asses-
sing the RCT. To convert such cases into Gouldian repetitions, it must be shown that the features subject to convergence
result from developmental constraints that could easily have been otherwise. While it is true that Pax-6 is not function-
ally constrained and thus its conservation betrays the signature of historical contingency (like other upstream
components of development that are refractory to selective modification), as gene manipulation studies show, Pax-6
is not causally responsible for the specific morphological features on which convergence judgements rest [10,11], and
thus there is no reason to believe that Pax-6 plays a constraining role that would undermine the independence of com-
plex eye evolution. Third, even if the photoreceptor cell evolved only once in the known history of life, the extent to
which this fact undercuts the evolutionary robustness of complex eye evolution depends on whether the origination
of photoreception is itself a radically contingent event—i.e. whether it is unlikely to be replicated across the vast
majority of alternative histories of life. We cannot simply infer from the fact of singular origin that a trait is radically
contingent, given the possibility of strong functional constraints (as with rhodopsin, above). At present, the most we
can say is that the evolutionary replicability of basic photoreception remains an open question, although the replicability
of complex eyes is robust if the existence of photoreception is taken among the relevant initial conditions. So even if
complex eye evolution is not universally biologically projectable, it is certainly in tension with the RCT insofar as the
latter is framed as a more limited thesis about what we can expect from replays of the tape of multicellular life on
the Earth.
Evolutionary significance. The evolution of eyes was of great evolutionary significance. Eye-bearing species comprise a
huge proportion of known animal diversity [53] and likely kickstarted active predation in the Cambrian [51], which in
turn led to a cascade of strategic coevolutionary responses including (quite plausibly) the evolution of skeletons in numer-
ous groups as well as the convergent evolution of competing eyes and associated expansions of nervous and
musculoskeletal systems [57].
Multiple realizability. In the nested multiple realizability base, camera and compound eye configurations each represent
more specific structural realizations of the vision adaptation, which in turn is a more specific realization of image formation.
Image formation is greater in scope because it includes not only vision but also certain non-visual sensory modalities, such
echolocation and electrolocation, which have also been the subject of evolutionary iterations. Due to constraints of the phys-
ical laws, there may be only a few types of waveform energy that organisms can use—such as light, electromagnetism and
sound—to form complex, real-time topographic images of their environment. The few biological structures that are capable
of harnessing this energy, and the brains necessary to process the information it provides, have been realized repeatedly in
the history of life.
Evidential summary. This case supports key premises of the robust replicability view, namely that certain design problems
are (i) pervasive in the history of life, (ii) solved by a limited number of structurally specific solutions, and (iii) accessible to










10highly independent evolutionary repetitions offers stronger
evidence against the RCT than does a large number of non-
independent repetitions. Independence is most directly
assessed by laboratory investigation, such as through gene
‘knock-out’ studies that determine the specific causal role of
the developmental mechanisms involved in the production
of a given homoplasy, in conjunction with phylogenetic recon-
structions of those mechanisms. Although a full accounting of
independence requires causal and phylogenetic analyses of
developmental mechanisms, where this information is una-
vailable, phylogenetic distance can be used as a tentative
proxy by which to infer levels of independence.
According to the ‘taxonomy heuristic’ (§4), iterations with
a narrow phylogenetic distribution (i.e. iterations limited to
lower-level taxa) are, ceteris paribus, more likely to be Goul-
dian repetitions than cases of true convergence. Consider,
for example, ‘hummingbird flowers’—odourless, brick-red,
trumpet-shaped flowers rich in nectar that have evolved to
attract nectar-feeding birds nearly 20 times [24, p. 124].
Because this iteration is confined to low-level taxa, it gives
us little confidence in the deep counterfactual stability or pro-
jectibility of the outcomes involved. In some cases, the specific
conserved genetic homologues involved in a given phylogen-
etically narrow iteration have been identified. This is true for
the iterated evolution of stickleback fish morphologies (see
below), and will likely soon be true for the evolution of
Anolis ecomorphologies whose conserved developmental
underpinnings are now coming to light. On the other hand,
the phylogenetic distribution of an iterated outcome like vivi-
parity (the development of embryos within the body of the
female) is wide, having evolved over twice as many times
as hummingbird flowers in far more distant lineages [24,
p. 86] using very disparate developmental machinery. Other
iterated traits with fairly high levels of specificity are found
in clades as developmentally disparate as plants and animals:
an example is urticating hair, barbed bristles connected to
cells that produce poisonous or acrid fluids, which are
designed to break off and lodge in the skin of predators.
The concept of independence as it applies to convergent
regularities poses its own set of difficulties, however. In
addition to the limitations of using phylogenetic distance as a
proxy for developmental distance (discussed in §4), there is
also the problem that we must be able to determine which
aspects of development are the relevant causes of a given
homoplasy, because some homologous molecular-develop-
mental mechanisms will nearly always exist. One way of
doing this would be to identify ‘causally specific’ developmen-
tal homologues implicated in convergent regularities [11]. On
this approach, the less casually specific the conserved develop-
mental causes of a given iteration, the more independent that
iteration would be. As others have pointed out [40], however,
there is an ambiguity with regard to what constitutes the same
or sufficiently similar developmental underpinnings, as this
could refer to the same gene mutations, to mutations to the
same gene region, and so on. These conceptual problems
must be ironed out if we are to fully understand the evidentiary
relevance of convergence to the contingency debate.5.3. Scope
Convergent regularities also vary in terms of their scope, or the
ubiquity of the conditions under which they obtain. If convergent
regularities are limited by conditions that are astronomicallyuncommon in the universe and only accidentally obtain on the
Earth, then these regularities will have a very narrow scope.
This, in turn, will restrict their ability to serve as evidence for
the robust replicability thesis and against the RCT, where these
theses are interpreted as contradicting claims about the modal
frequency of certain evolutionary outcomes (§2).
The limiting conditions for convergent regularities include
(i) ‘external’ ecological factors, such as features of the abiotic
environment like the drag of water or the presence of light,
and features of the biotic environment like the existence of
companion species with which to coevolve, and (ii) ‘internal’
developmental factors relating to the evolvability of the trait
in question. Each of these conditions is expected to be appli-
cable to different extents over the course of the Earth’s
evolutionary history and to other potential life worlds. Some
limiting conditions, like the presence of light or water, are ubi-
quitous and thus do little to restrict the scope (and hence
projectibility) of convergent regularities. Other limiting con-
ditions are extremely rare or accidentally confined to narrow
subsets of life on the Earth, thus resulting in a highly restricted
scope that precludes exobiological projectibility.
The scope of a convergent regularity is only as wide as its
most limiting condition, be it external or internal to the line-
age in question. Because we are not currently capable of
identifying all of the conditions that underpin a given regu-
larity, in assessing scope the most limiting conditions
should be our focus. For example, some convergent regu-
larities, like the cantharophilous flowers discussed above,
depend on the existence of morphologically specific pollinator
lineages such as beetles—a form that so far as we know is a
radically contingent outcome of life on this planet. So the
repeated evolution of beetle-pollinated flowers, by virtue of
this highly contingent ecological prerequisite, does not sup-
port exobiological projectibility, or even stability across deep
Earthly rewinds of the tape of life. Contrast this case with,
say, convergence in vessels to transport water, which evolved
many fewer times than beetle-pollinating morphology but
which, given the invariant physics of water transport, are uni-
versally projectible. Similarly, the biomechanics of fusiform
shapes require the existence of life in a fluid environment
and the internal structure necessary to maintain a sturdy
shape—conditions that are likely widespread in environments
conducive to the evolution of complex multicellular life.
Internal factors that limit the scope of convergent regu-
larities are equally important, because they explain why
Gouldian repetitions are neither projectible to other life
worlds nor stable across deep replays of the known tape of
life on the Earth—even though they underwrite impressive
degrees of replicabilityacross ‘shallower’ rewinds. For example,
given constraints of the mammalian body plan and certain
recurring ecological conditions, a range of specific mammalian
forms may be highly replicable over a 55 million year period of
evolution. Yet due to their internal developmental limiting con-
ditions, these regularities may not be highly robust features of
life on the Earth, let alone of other potential life worlds.
Nevertheless, Gouldian repetitions are to some degree pro-
jectible, and the extent of their projectibility depends in part on
the phylogenetic prevalence of their conserved developmental
mechanisms. For example, the iterated evolution of reduced
pelvic armour in stickleback fish in isolated glacial lakes was
accomplished via the selective deactivation of a common gen-
etic homologue (the Pitx1 gene, which controls pelvic fin














































Figure 2. Here we illustrate three key dimensions of robustness with respect to which evolutionary regularities may be described. Each evolutionary iteration
(labelled) is approximately located in a three-dimensional space along axes reflecting its degree of specificity, independence and scope, illustrating the extent
to which it represents evidence against the RCT conceived either as a general thesis or as a particular thesis about specific evolutionary outcomes (with the strongest
such cases found in the darkest shaded region). Some iterated regularities, such as hummingbird flowers or predator avoidance, do little to contradict the RCT,





11across very ‘shallow’ rewinds of the tape of life. These out-
comes are robust only when the initial set-up includes the
specific developmental parameters of this particular family of
fish, which easily could have been otherwise. Mammalian eco-
morphologies may be more evolutionarily robust as indicated
by their somewhat deeper phylogenetic distribution, but they
will still be of limited projectibility, even on the Earth. In con-
trast, the convergent evolution of salinity tolerance across the
archeal and bacterial domains reflects a deeper rewind of the
tape of life, controlling for internal limiting conditions and
thus indicating a high degree of exobiological projectibility—
though this outcome is arguably of sufficiently low specificity
to be consistent with the RCT.
Couched in terms of scope, a key problem with the cri-
tique from convergent evolution is that it has failed to
distinguish iterations of plausibly universal scope from
those with more narrow limiting conditions. For instance,
the evolution of fusiform shapes among mobile macrobes in
aquatic environments has greater scope than that of dolphi-
noid shapes, given the additional body plan limiting
conditions that underpin the latter regularity. By paying care-
ful attention to the interrelated aspects of specificity,
independence and scope, we can address the lumping pro-
blem and begin to distinguish convergences that speak to
the RCT from those that do not (figure 2).6. Conclusion
We have shown that many convergent regularities do not con-
tradict the RCT, either because they are too vague (such as
mimicry, thermoregulation or the fusiform shape), or because
they depend on radically contingent internal constraints thatmake them Gouldian repetitions (such as Anolis, stickleback
and mammalian ecomorphologies). We have sketched a tax-
onomy of natural experiments in convergent evolution with
an eye toward identifying iterations that are maximally
robust: outcomes that are expected to occur in most or all
replays of the tape of life. Nevertheless, some worries remain.
One worry is that even if we were able to document an
impressive number of true convergences that exhibit great
specificity, independence and scope, there are clearly many
more cases of non-convergence given similar initial conditions,
suggesting that such outcomes are readily defeasible. For
instance, the vast majority of lineages with eyespots (approx.
70) have never evolved an eye with a distinct lens, which
suggests that non-convergence is far more common than con-
vergence when it comes to the evolution of eyes. This, in turn,
might be taken to undercut the law-like necessity of this particu-
lar macroevolutionary outcome. However, this conclusion does
not follow, for as we saw earlier (§2), true convergence can be
framed as a low-probability probabilistic phenomenon (cov-
ered, e.g. by statistical laws). Moreover, it is unclear how to
determine which conditions must be similar in order to identify
instances of non-convergence. The worry here is that any given
outcome could be disqualified as a candidate for non-
convergence on the grounds that the natural experiment was
not similar in the right ways.
In any case, the ratio of convergent/non-convergent events
given similar initial conditions is orthogonal to the task at
hand, which is to evaluate the RCT. As we have seen (§2), the
RCT does not claim certain evolutionary outcomes will be rare
in each history of life; rather, it holds that there exist many impor-
tant outcomes at particular levels of description that are unlikely
to be (re)produced at all in thousands of histories of life. So even a





12single history of life can provide powerful evidence against a
strong version of the RCT—namely, the thesis that no important
and sufficiently specific evolutionary outcomes are robustly
replicable—as well as against specific contingency theses
concerning particular outcomes.
Of course, we can never be certain about the robustness of
an iterated regularity without an extraterrestrial dataset,
because we cannot rule out the possibility that what is thought
to be a case of true convergence is in fact the result of unknown
hidden variables that make it a Gouldian repetition. Neverthe-
less, we have shown that there are strong candidates for true
convergence that are of great scientific interest and importance
in the history of life. In so doing, we hope to have laid the
groundwork for a more effective use of convergent evolution
as evidence in evaluating Gould’s provocative thesis.
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1To pick but one example, the famously bizarre Hallucigenia has been
identified as a stem onychophoran (velvet worm), a group closely
related to arthropods [3].
2Our general focus on eukaryotic evolution is partially due to histori-
cal interest (this was Gould’s focus), and partly due to the fact that
prokaryotic evolution may be overwhelmed by lateral gene transfer
[22], making convergent evolution hard to assess in the prokaryotic
history of life [23].
3Although most discussions of convergent evolution focus on mor-
phology, the concept is broad enough to encompass similarities in
molecular and developmental structure, as well as functional and rela-
tional resemblances, irrespective of their particular structural realization.
4In his last and most comprehensive monograph, Gould contends
that ‘homologous developmental pathways can also be employed. . . as active facilitators of homoplastic adaptations that might other-
wise be very difficult, if not impossible, to construct in such strikingly
similar form from such different starting points across such immense
phyletic gaps’ [8, p. 1122–1123].
5As Okasha [32] points out, many classic experiments in physics,
such as the crucial tests of general relativity, are essentially observa-
tional and do not involve human intervention in nature. At the same
time, few studies in the historical sciences, such as palaeontology and
geology, are purely observational, because they often involve con-
trolled, systematic searches, guided by a wealth of background
theory (such as plate tectonics and common descent), employ
increasingly refined methods of data collection (such as dating and
reconstructing fossils) and are carried out with the aim of testing
hypotheses (such as the claim that a bolide impact triggered the
end-Cretaceous extinction). Nor is there a clear epistemic asymmetry
between observational and manipulational studies in terms of their
tendency to generate knowledge about the causal structure of the bio-
logical world. In fact, Brandon [33] shows that controlled studies in
evolutionary biology, which create highly artificial conditions in the
laboratory, are often weakly projectable to the natural living world.
Laboratory or field manipulation is therefore not a prerequisite for
making justified inferences about evolutionary history.
6The concept of ‘natural experiment’ that we employ here corre-
sponds, roughly, to what Morgan [35] calls ‘nature’s experiments’.
7There are several other major accounts of homology on offer in the
literature, such as developmental and transformational accounts
(see reference [37] for a review). We focus on the taxic account here
because not only is it the dominant account, it is the account most
often relied upon by convergence proponents in their critiques of
the RCT.
8We introduce this distinction, rather than relying on the contested
convergence-parallelism demarcation, because some accounts of par-
allelism would exclude many Gouldian repetitions, and because the
theoretical motivations for delineating parallelism extend beyond the
contingency debate.
9‘Developmental constraint’ remains a contested concept in biology
[41–43], and precisely how conserved developmental mechanisms
that are relevant to a given iteration can be distinguished from broader
developmental homology poses conceptual problems that remain
unsolved [11,39,40,44]. These conceptual problems must be sorted
out, however, if convergence is to serve as evidence against the RCT.
10Currie [29] reserves the term ‘specificity’ for the level of detail in a
generalization and ‘grain’ as a measure of the similarity between
existing traits (or environments).
11Although many examples of functional convergence lack specificity,
in some cases functional traits can be specified with high precision—
such as various jaw functions related to prey capture in fish [49],
and specific cleaning symbioses in crustaceans, fish and birds [50].References1. Gould SJ. 1990 Wonderful life: the burgess shale and
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